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2Introduction
In thirty years Singapore has been transformed from a equatorial entrepot into one of
the world’s most competitive economies. Its economy grew at an average of 9.1%
between 1960 and 1990. Its GNP per capita increased from S$435 in 1960 to
S$26,475 in 1997 taking it above France, Sweden, Hong Kong and the United
Kingdom. The economic success of Singapore and the other Asian Tiger economies
most notably South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, were seen to be closely
connected to the development of their human resources. The outstanding
performance the Japan and the Asian Tigers in international tests in Mathematics
and Science is assumed to confirm this view: Singapore is frequently top in both
subjects. For the authors of the World Bank report The Asian Miracle there was little
to add to the explanation that it was the quality of the workforce that held the key to
explaining the success of these economies, but other analysts pointed to the crucial
role of the ‘developmental’ state in orchestrating the exponential economic
development in these countries, ‘A state is developmental when it establishes as its
principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding
by development the combination of steady high rates of economic growth and
structural change in the economic system, both domestically and in its relationship to
the international economy’ (Castells,1996: 182).
The purpose of this paper is not to engage in a detailed historical analysis of
Singapore’s economic development as there are now a number of good accounts but
rather to examine the issues, challenges and prospects for Singapore in light of
economic globalisation, technological change, and the Asian financial crisis.1 This
crisis led many Western commentators to predict a global convergence based on the
Anglo-Saxon model of market capitalism. Such a convergence is also predicted
because globalisation is assumed to lead to a significant decline in the powers of the
nation state to control the fate of their economies apart from investment in education,
training and economic infrastructure, including transportation, communications and
the environment.
Such arguments make Singapore an important case study because it is one of the
most ‘open’ economies in the world as it exports virtually everything that it produces
and imports virtually everything that it consumes, including drinking water (Chua,
1999). It is the world’s most trade dependent economy accounting for 93 per cent of
its GDP.2  Its whole economic strategy has depended on attracting inward investment
from leading MNCs, and approximately two-thirds of jobs in Singapore depend on
this kind of inward invest. Following the logic of the global convergence thesis, which
can be found on both the political left and right, we would expect Singapore to
significantly reduce the role of the state to meeting the investment needs of global
business. We would also expect to find a human capital model of labour market
flexibility based on the meshing together of the rational interests of individuals and
companies with little state interference (Wade, 1990).
3This paper will show that we need to move beyond the state v’s market and the strong
v’s weak state found in both the popular and academic literature. For although the
state will continue to play a vital role in Singapore, there are significant limitations
placed on its actions by its own brand of developmental capitalism. These challenges
not only stem from the Asian financial crisis and the continuing integration of the world
economy, but from the consequences of a second industrial transformation, where the
‘learning’ model of the mass production of goods and services has become a source
of ‘trained incapacity’ in a knowledge-driven economy.
Here Singapore confronts the same problem as other ‘later developers’ who have
relied on the grooming of ‘expert followers’ who have achieved spectacular economic
growth through what Alice Amsden has called the ‘paradigm of late industrialization
through learning’ (1989:4). Economies commencing industrialization in the twentieth
century transformed their production structures and raised their incomes per capita
on the basis of borrowed technology and the systematic technical training of the
workforce as Amsden suggests, ‘If industrialisation first occurred in England on the
basis of invention, and if it occurred in Germany and the United States on the basis of
innovation, then it occurs now among “backward” countries on the basis of learning’
(Amsden 1989:4).3
The study of skill formation in Singapore at the beginning of the twentieth-first century
is, therefore, the study of post-industrial changes in our understanding of the global,
national, local and personal (Ball, 1998). Block (1990) argues that the task is to map
the patterns and characteristic conflicts of the emergent postindustrial or knowledge-
driven societies and to show ‘how these observable patterns conflict with the system
of categories that has organized social life in the industrial period’ (p.13). Thus, the
question of how Singapore is attempting to move towards a ‘knowledge’ economy is
a focal concern of this paper.
The paper is divided into two sections. In Section One we trace Singapore’s
economic strategy over the last forty years and how this has shaped its skill formation
strategy, along with a ‘new’ model of the worker-citizen. The Second Section
examines the challenges now confronting Singapore in its attempt to become a
knowledge-driven economy. Here we will examine four key ‘pressure points’ which
confront all the developed economies in albeit different ways (Brown, 1999).4 Firstly,
how the nation state seeks to legitimate its role in skill formation in the context of
economic globalisation? Can the role of the ‘developmental’ state be maintained?
Secondly, whether the strategies and policies for upgrading the skills of the workforce
can contribute to learning, innovation and productivity in a knowledge-driven
economy? Thirdly, can the ‘positional’ competition for education, training and
employment be organised in ways which contribute to equality of opportunity and
social inclusion? What is the foundation of social cohesion? and; finally, can the
education and training system succeed in modelling a new worker-citizen?
4Section One: From Entrepot to Knowledge Economy?
Skill formation in Singapore is central to its political viability as a city-state.
Singapore gained independence from British colonial rule in 1959. It had remained
economically underdeveloped, but the British did leave a viable public administration
and the English language. Both proved to be important facets of  Singapore’s
subsequent development. Linda Low (1998) argues that the years between 1959 and
1963 (when it entered the Malaysian Union only to be evicted in 1965) where decisive
in shaping the direction of the governing party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) which
continues to control the reins of political power forty years later. As we were told
‘Singapore is not like a typical government, governments come and go!’. The PAP
did not adopt the laissez faire approach of the British as the PAP was founded as a
socialist party (Low, 1998). Moreover, unless the PAP could build social cohesion,
communist antagonists and ethnic tensions would undermine its political power base,
a view crystallised by race riots in 1964.
The PAP succeed in building social cohesion on the based of economic nationalism,
where prosperity for all was to be pursued through national economic development.
The PAP rationalised this approach around the ‘ideology of survival’. The geo-
political vulnerability of Singapore was used to reinforce the message that the world
does not owe Singaporian’s a living. They must pull together to improve their
economic competitiveness. This sense of national survival remains strong given a
widely shared belief that its powerful neighbours would not offer favourable terms if
Singapore failed to survive as a viable city-state. Singaporian’s frequently recite the
fact that virtually at take-off from Changi Airport you enter Malaysian or Indonesian
airspace.
A further ingredient of the PAP ideology of survival concerns the organisation of
political leadership. As Beng-Huat Chua has asserted the ideology of survival was
used to promote the idea that ‘the population must be transformed into a tightly
organised and highly disciplined citizenry all pulling in the same direction with a
sense of public spiritedness and self-sacrifice in the national interest…as part of the
disciplining process, possible bases for organised sectional interests had to be
controlled, the most significant of which was the subordination of the trade unions to
the PAP government’ (1995:18).
The PAP defined itself as the ‘trustee’ of the nation, making demands on the
stakeholders (Singaporians) in anticipation of a healthy return on their investment of
energy, skills and commitment. Democratic freedoms where traded for improvements
in material prosperity. Almost every facet of social and personal life has been subject
to government regulation for economic ends. But in return as a senior advisor
observed, in creating a surplus, ‘you distribute the goodies. This makes the people
5beholden and then it pulls up the economy’. As this ‘settlement’ began to deliver
economic fruits the PAP attempted to de-politicise the administration of ‘Singapore
Inc’. It argued that the role of government is largely technocratic, ensuring that
sectional interests are held at bay whether these stem from employers, professional
groups, trade unions or ethnic rivalries.5 But equally the ‘developmental’ state in
Singapore has been presented by its chief architect Lee Kuan Yew as a system that
should not be meddled with, as Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew once remarked,
‘Singapore is man-made and can be easily unscrambled. We move away from
certain basic values and principles, and Humpty Dumpty will never be put together
again’.6
Competitive strategy
As rising prosperity for all could only be achieved through a process of moving the
workforce up the ‘value chain’ of economic activities, skill formation issues were at
the core of its competitive strategy. Hence the question of economic competitiveness
and that of the role of the state in upgrading the skills of the workforce, are
understood in almost identical terms by all policy stakeholders in Singapore. This
consensus is based on the view that economic development cannot be left to the
operation of the global market place, as Philip Yeo, CEO of the Economic
Development Board (EDB) observed, ‘our government has always been a
development capitalist’.7
In the early days a major economic problem was that there was little scope for import
substitution favoured by other Asian economies such as Japan and South Korea,
given its small population. Following the demise of its brief federation with Malaysia
(1963-1965), it had to look externally for both inward investment and export markets,
based on the recommendations of the United Nations Survey Mission in the early
1960s led by Dr Albert Winsemius (Low et al.,1993). Singapore was an early
beneficiary of the multinational companies (MNCs) moving into South-East Asia.
Whereas many developed nations are currently grappling with the consequences of
an increasingly global labour market, where nations could no longer depend on
‘national champions’ offering mass employment to the indigenous workforce, this has
been a fact of life for Singapore’s political elite for decades.
Hence its export orientation was timely. Foreign MNCs were looking to reduce their
labour costs by moving low-skill production to Newly Industrialising Nations such as
Singapore. The Economic Development Board (EDB) has played a pivotal role in
keeping the virtuous circle of economic competitiveness, skills upgrading and rising
prosperity, in motion given that ‘employers will not skill for the future, only their short-
term needs, this is a state responsibility’. The image of Singapore as an open free
market economy does not square with much that one finds behind the window
dressing. This image is cultivate for the consumption of American companies,
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assumes that a good place to do business must mean a free-market economy. If you
meet a Singaporian economist at the National University it is highly likely they have
spent time studying in the United States or Britain, and will have bookshelves stuffed
with Western economics textbooks, but in the development of economic policy in
Singapore most of this literature is not simply ignored but conspicuously violated. A
clue to what they call ‘strategic pragmatism’ (Schein, 1996) in Singapore, can be
found in the recruitment of staff to the EDB. In the West such an agency would be full
of economists and accountants, but approximately three-quarters of EDB staff were
initially trained as engineers, because this is believed to give them a more hands-on
approach when talking to companies about investment in Singapore.
In order for the EDB to fulfil its developmental role it became highly skilled at foresight
planning that involves scanning the global for companies, inventions and people able
to add value to Singapore’s strategic initiatives in new or emerging spheres of
economic activity. It has regional offices around the world which enables the EDB to
develop personal contacts with key corporate personnel necessary to build the trust
relations which are often necessary before companies will commit to the inward
investment deals that the EDB were interested in attracting. Like other countries the
EDB uses a range of incentives including cheap rents, tax breaks, cheap energy
supplies, etc., but in Singapore these are invariably linked to a commitment to skills
upgrading. This involves the EDB initiating new training programmes at very short
notice in advance of MNCs arriving in Singapore to fulfil its commitment to supply
skilled labour. The government would typically pay for the bulk of this training on the
understanding that more workers would be trained than immediately necessary, using
state of the art technologies sometimes provided by the MNCs, but enhanced by
major government investments in tertiary education and training provision. The
reason for training more workers that strictly required was to encourage the inward
investor to expand their operations and to make it easier to attract other companies
in the same industrial sectors to enter Singapore in an attempt to create industrial
clusters.
The coordinating role of the EDB is only possible when there is an institutional
framework of ‘joined up’ government that includes the education and training system,
housing, land and environmental agencies. This allows the EDB to offer a ‘one stop’
approach, where the inward investor can deal with one person within the Board,
responsible for overseeing the business start-up within Singapore. Once in the City-
State the EDB works closely with companies to move production or service delivery
up the value-added skills chain, which as we will see, now involves helping MNCs to
establish low-skills operations in neighbouring countries.
The EDB was very successful in attracting electronics companies from America,
Europe and Japan. This contributed to a rise in manufacturing employment from 16.1
per cent in the early 1960s, to an average of 26.4 in the 1970s and 28 per cent in the
1980s.8 This early competitive strategy based on attracting low skill, low wage
7manufacturing was also motivated by an unemployment rate that stood at 14 percent
in 1960. However, within a decade fears about unemployment turned to issues of
labour shortages. These led to the import of labour from countries including Malaysia,
Indonesia, China and the Philippines. Much of this labour was unskilled making it
difficult to encourage employers to upgrade the skills of workers. Attempts to upgrade
the workforce where also put on hold following the oil crisis in 1973 and the world
recession in the mid-1970s. Unemployment reached 4.6 per cent in 1975 despite the
employment buffer provided by the flexible use of foreign workers (Bello & Rosenfeld,
1990).
The decisive move came when the government announced what it called a ‘wage
correction’ policy in 1979 through the tripartite National Wages Council, formed in
1972 to regulate wages and to ensure that all sections of the workforce were able to
benefit through economic growth. Labour costs rose by approximately 10 per cent
between 1979 and 1984 in contrast to productivity growth of 4.4 per cent (Low,
1998:45). The question of productivity was to be resolved by attracting capital
intensive and high skilled employment, with the ‘active’ encouragement from
government to move low wage, low skill jobs out of Singapore. As Ashton et al.
(1999) have noted the process of skills upgrading coincided with similar moves in
Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ‘The close
timing of events suggests that all four Asia ‘tigers’ were subject to similar external
constraints’ in their bid to maintain economic competitiveness (Ashton, et al., 1999:
47).
In Singapore this approach was supported by a levy on low paid jobs, with the money
being channelled into the Skills Development Fund (SDF) used to fund a range of
training programmes aimed at lifting the skills base of the workforce. This strategy led
to fears about the ‘hollowing out’ of industry, as a leading electronics MNC located in
Singapore noted, ‘If you take everything away, what is left? So they were balancing on
very tight ropes…They were very open in telling you that there is only 3 million people.
We can’t afford you having thousands and thousands of people in each company. So
please re-think what you can put here. We also don’t want to force you to pay too
high, but because of our limitations we have to push wages up’. This strategy
represented a clear example of where the state presented itself as a ‘trustee’, holding
both employers and trade unions as arms length in the ‘national interest’.
This attempt to launch Singapore in the direction of a high skills economy had little
immediate impact apart from leading to a 40 per cent reduction in new investment
and some MNCs moved their low-skilled operations out of Singapore. But the
general thrust of the government’s policy to upgrade the skills of the economy had
been established, and has meet with considerable success (See Table 1). This in
turn has led to a recognition that for Singapore to maintain its commitment to
economic growth and prosperity in the twenty-first century a more fundamental
change in the economy and the system of skill formation was required. A view
reinforced by the Asian financial crisis. Indeed, the response of the Singapore
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It did not wait for the miracle drug of the market to lead Asia to recovery.
Table One: Changes in Occupation  Composition in Singapore 1987 - 1997
(%)
                                                           1987         1997
Occupational Composition
Professional and Managerial               12.1         21.5
Technical and Associate Profs            10.5         17.5
Clerical workers                                   14.1         15.2
Sales and service workers                   15.7         12.5
Production & related workers               41.7         29.8
Others                                                    5.9           3.5
Source: Report on the Labour Force Survey of Singapore 1997, Research and Statistics Department,
Ministry of Labour 1998 p.ix.
The Asian financial crisis led wage competitiveness in Singapore to deteriorate as
the regions economies competed for a ‘shrinking economic pie’.9 The government
immediately imposed to a 15 per cent reduction in wage costs through a cut in
employer contributions to the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a compulsory savings
scheme, along with wage cuts for all groups of workers based on the principle of
collective sacrifice.
As Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong suggested, ‘Singapore now, unlike in 1985, is in a
strong position to weather this storm. The economy is much more diversified,
sophisticated and resilient. Our reserves are strong. We must use this period of
economic slowdown to consolidate our strengths, build new capabilities, seek out
emerging opportunities and position ourselves to ride the next wave of growth in
Asia’.10 Given a belief that as regional competitors emerge from the financial crisis
leaner, fitter and more cost competitive there was a need to ‘accelerate the
upgrading of our economy’ towards a ‘developed knowledge economy’ (Ministry of
Trade and Industry, 1998:10).
The Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness, responsible for examining the
implications of the Asian financial crisis concurred, ‘We should be a knowledge
economy where the basis for competitiveness will be the capabilities and intellectual
capital to absorb, process and apply knowledge. We should have a strong
technological capability and a vibrant entrepreneurial culture that thrives on creativity,
nimbleness and good business sense. To develop into a knowledge economy,
Singapore should be an open cosmopolitan society, attractive to global talent and
9connected with other global knowledge nodes. There should be a critical mass of
Singaporeans who are risk-taking entrepreneurs, innovators and arbitrageurs.
Together with the global talent, they will move Singapore ahead in the Information
Age.’11
However this shift in competitive strategy cannot be achieved without changing  the
nature of business activity, including the operations of the MNCs. Singapore has
adopted a high skills strategy which involved moving low skilled manufacturing out of
Singapore to neighbouring countries (growth triangles), whilst using various
incentives, to attract high value added manufacturing and services to establish
Singapore as a business hub.
In manufacturing, the aim is to focus on industrial clusters given constraints of land,
labour and cost effectiveness. The main clusters are electronics (data storage &
imaging; computers, communications & consumer electronics; semiconductors; key
modules & devices); chemicals (petroleum; petrochemical; speciality & industrial
chemicals); and engineering (precision engineering; marine; aerospace; process
engineering).12 The strategy is to move up the value-added chain beyond production
to sales, marketing, design and R&D. Knowledge intensive ‘sunrise’ industries are
currently being attracted to Singapore, these including wafer fabrication and
biotechnology. An indication of this shift is that two out of every three jobs created in
1997 were for ‘knowledge and skilled workers’, compared to only half the jobs
created in 1995.13 The success of this strategy will depend on the development of
exportable service clusters including headquarters services; logistics; communication
and media; R&D; education; and health-care. These include the management and
distribution of financial services, information technology (IT) services, E-commerce
and direct marketing. The development of an International Business Hub focusing on
these service clusters is anticipated to generate a large proportion of ‘skilled’ jobs.14
Indicative of Singapore’s current skill formation strategy is the Industry 21 (I 21)
initiative launched by the EDB in 1998. It is anticipated that knowledge-driven
industries under I 21 will contribute 40% of Singapore’s annual GDP, and create
20,000 to 25,000 jobs every year over ten years. Of these two out of every three jobs
will be for knowledge and skilled workers in the manufacturing sector; and three out of
four in the exportable services sector. ‘I 21 aims to develop Singapore into a leading
competence centre for knowledge-driven activities, as well as strengthens Singapore
as a hub for company headquarters and product charters’.15 A key part of the
investment in the social and economic infrastructure, especially for the IT,
communications and media sector is Singapore One, which is a broadband network
across Singapore, capable of delivering interactive multi-media applications
including access to the Internet and e-commerce (Selwyn & Brown, forthcoming).
Lim Swee Say, Deputy General Secretary of the National Trade Union Congress
(NTUC) has identified a key part of this changing relationship with the MNCs. He
suggested that Singapore had offered ‘an excellent business infrastructure and a
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disciplined workforce for them to produce and distribute products and services cost
effectively out of Singapore to the global markets. In return, we benefit from not just
their foreign capital, but also their technology and global markets. This strategy of
‘borrowed technology and borrowed markets’ has served us well up till now. However,
it is not sustainable. To continue to be relevant to the global companies, we need to
broaden and deepen our capability profile. We need to go beyond cost management.
We must be able to create value and help generate revenue by getting directly
involved in the development of new technology, innovation, production process,
market, and management know-how’ (1998:42).
The shift to a developed knowledge-driven economy also involves a change in the
nature of its developmental strategy. This represents an extension rather than a
retreat from the state’s role in economic development. Again the financial crisis in
Asia has exposed an underlying problem, namely that other regional economies have
been upgrading their skill base in order to compete for intermediate skills, at the
same time neighbouring economies have experienced a significant decline in their
national currencies, which appear to make Singapore look increasingly expensive. It
is recognised that the only way to lock foreign MNCs into Singapore is to create a
research and design capability that cannot be easily transplanted elsewhere. The
development of ‘indigenous capability’ in more knowledge-intensive manufacturing
and services therefore depends in part on rooting the MNCs core value added
activities such as R&D, design, marketing and business services in Singapore. As
we were told at an interview with the National Science and Technology Board
(NSTB), ‘when you say indigenous capability, what we mean is that Hewlett Packard,
Singapore will not be able to do it elsewhere, the ideas, the decision-making, are all
from here. Benefits will be stable, they will not just move their operations away
because this is the source - this is the source of new ideas’.
This issue is associated with the long standing problem of what is seen as an  over-
reliance on foreign MNCs. This has increasingly constrained the government’s room
for manoeuvre and more seriously, the extent of technology transfer and skill diffusion
to local businesses has been disappointing (Ashton et al., 1999: 44). The
development of knowledge-intensive activities in manufacturing and service sector
clusters, is now part of an attempt to attract businesses to set up headquarters
operations in Singapore to help extend the global reach of indigenous businesses
and workers. Global networking is seen as essential for ideas, capital, technology,
resources and markets. This policy is reflected in the creation of new ‘research’
universities in niche areas such as business studies, life sciences, etc., to be run by
world-class universities in these fields such as INSEAD for management and John
Hopkins University for Life Sciences.
‘Singapore Inc.’ is being transformed into ‘Singapore Unlimited’. But this does not
signify the rise of the virtual state as characterised by Richard Rosecrance (1999). A
more accurate description is of Singapore as a ‘one nation, dual economy’. Here the
state performs a vital role in Singapore, at the same time as performing a virtual role
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in the region. The developed of an ‘external wing’ began in the early 1990s with the
Singapore government acting as a outward investor in the region. This takes the form
of joint ventures with regional governments, MNC or Government Linked Companies
(GLCs). The virtual role of the state has become increasingly important in its
‘developmental’ capacity given limitations of land and labour within Singapore. This
approach gives the EDB the flexibility to encourage the development of a business
hub or advance manufacturing in Singapore at the same time as participating in
setting up low-skilled operations elsewhere within the region; or as we were told ‘you
keep the brains here, export the brawn’.
There is another rationale for its ‘dual’ economic strategy that reflects the changing
demands of global knowledge-driven enterprise. It is based on the recognition that
unlike much of the debate in Britain and the United States, there is a need to create
its own ‘national champions’ precisely because these Singaporian MNCs would give
the country a more secure economic footing and enhance its growth potential.
Singapore’s virtual involvement in the regional economy is a way of developing its
own World-Class Companies (WWCs) and Local Enterprises [LEs]. The EDB has
identified approximately 300 Promising Local Enterprises to ‘accelerate their growth’
by offering financial assistance, resource support, image building, technology
acquisition, strategic alliances and business partnerships’ (EDB, 1998). But this
approach is seen to depend on innovation and knowledge-driven entrepreneurial
activities that have not been a characteristic feature of the country’s skill formation
strategy to date.
The Changing Model of the Worker-Citizen
Given Singapore’s post-colonial status and civil strife in the 1960s it is perhaps
inevitable that the education system was identified as a key institution for social and
economic reform. The use of the education system as an instrument of nation building
is a feature of all state systems of education (Green, 1990) Yet in the late 1950s
children where schooled on the grounds of ethnicity - Chinese, Malay, Tamil and
English - which proved to be a major source of political and social tension, as Lee
Kuan Yew observed, ‘If in the four different languages of instruction, we teach our
children four different standards of right and wrong, four different ideal patterns of
behaviour, then we will produce four different groups of people and there will be no
integrated coherent society. What is in the balance is the very foundation of our
society. For if we are not to perish in chaos caused by antagonisms and prejudices
between watertight cultural and linguistic compartments, then you have to educate the
right responses amongst our young people in school’.16 Lee Kuan Yew’s response
was to institute a bilingual policy where students would be educated in English and
their ‘own’ language given that the population is split 77 per cent Chinese, 14 per
cent Malay, 7 per cent Indian and 2 per cent other.
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Lee Kuan Yew also understood that political stability in Singapore was not simply a
matter of the direct survival of the PAP, but that MNCs would only invest in the country
if stability could not be guaranteed. There was also an urgent need to ensure that the
potential workforce for the MNCs as literate, numerate and well disciplined. Again he
saw this as a task for a state system of education ‘We must have qualities of
leadership at the top and qualities of cohesion on the ground. This pyramidal
structure of top leaders, good executives, well-disciplined civic-conscious broad
mass can only be produced by our education’.17 The teaching of English was also
important because Singapore had to play host to MNCs from North America, Europe
and Japan. This meant that the workforce not only had to be well-disciplined but also
sufficiently cosmopolitan in outlook, rather than entrenched in ethnic or cultural
localism, to adapt to the different cultural proclivities of the MNCs moving into the
country.
From the outset there was little sense of education for its own sake. It was an
‘investment’ that the future of Singapore was seen to depend. Ashton and Sung
(1997) have argued that the relationship between education and economic
development is historically specific. Singapore may indeed be the first advanced
economy to approximate a ‘direct correspondence’ between education and
production (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). The subordination of the educational system to
the ‘needs’ of the economy was legitimated as necessary to ‘catch up’ with other
developing and developed nations. It was seen to reflect the meritocratic principles
on which Singapore was to be build. People were to be judged on their individual
abilities and efforts regardless of social class or ethnicity. The normal curve of ability
was taken for granted by the PAP political leadership, and as the above quotation
from Lee Kuan Yew suggests, he believed in a ‘cognitive elite’ rather than the ‘feudal
dogma of social predestination’ (Dewey, 1916) that supported the European
aristocracy in the nineteenth century.
This led to the creation of a selective and highly competitive system of education, but
one that has always been subordinated to the perceived needs of the economy. In the
1960s and 1970s, the main issue was how to raise the general standard of literacy
and numeracy. Universal free primary education was not accomplished until the mid-
1960s, reflected in the increase in the numbers of teachers from 10,590 in 1959 to
17,184 in 1965. Along with continued efforts to generate a socially disciplined
cohesive society, greater emphasis was placed on the demand for technical
education and training in recognition of the importance attached to the manufacturing
sector. A National Industrial Council was established, comprising the Ministers for
Education, Finance and Labour aimed at coordinating the growing demand for craft
and technical skills. All boys and some of the girls were expected to study technical
as well as academic subjects in the early years of Secondary education from 1969
onwards. The Singapore Technical Institute was also established and Ngee Ann
College, later to become a polytechnic, was upgraded to undertake the training of
industrial technicians (Yip et al. 1997: 11). In the 1970s the Industrial Training Board
(ITB) assumed responsibility for industrial training from the Technical Education
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Department, again as a way of integrating the activities of the educational system
with the changing demands for jobs in manufacturing.
By the end of the 1970s it was not only the quality of technical education that required
upgrading but the system as a whole as ‘certain ‘cracks’ and weaknesses in the
system became manifest. The Goh Report (1979) identified a number of problems: a
wastage of talent as a result of a rigid curriculum and common examination system
which favoured academic achievement; low literacy; ineffective bilingualism; a wide
disparity in school performance, low teacher morale and inefficiencies in the Ministry
of Education (Yip et al., 1997:15; Ashton et al., 1999). This report led to the
introduction of academic streaming at both primary and secondary levels so that ‘for
a child who is not meant for academic endeavours, streaming would help to ensure
that he acquires basic literacy and numeracy, as well as preparation in training for a
skill’ (Yip et al. 1997:17). It is worth noting here that assumptions about innate
differences in ability were presented as a temporal issue; giving ‘less capable’
students the chance to develop ‘at a pace slower than for the more capable’ whilst
also allowing ‘a child every opportunity to go as far as he can’.18
At the secondary level three streams where created: the Special, the Express and the
Normal. The Special route was offered to the top 10 per cent of students who where
expected to be bilingual at first language level and sit the General Certificate of
Education ‘O’ level after four years. The Express course taught to first language level
in only one language and also sat ‘O’ levels after four years, whilst the Normal
students sat a different ‘N’ level examination which reflected the less academic nature
of their studies. There was also greater scope for these students to study vocational
subjects of immediate relevance on entry to the labour market. The streaming of
students was extended in 1984 with the introduction of the Gifted Education
Programme (GEP) for the ‘intellectually gifted’ child although less that 1 per cent of
students have attended these schools. Along with this system of steaming is the
principle of ‘progression’ based on the idea that Singapore cannot waste the talents
of its people and given that intellectual maturation may vary, it is important to ensure
that students always have the opportunity to advance through to university.
This aspect of the New Education System (NES) outlined in the Goh Report was part
of a broader strategy to upgrade the quality of the workforce. It is no coincidence that
this Report was published at the same time that wages where increased to
encourage employers to raise the skills and productivity of the work force. Yip et al.
suggest that ‘Where the reforms of the preceding two decades had been taken up
largely with immediate needs - viz the survival and socioeconomic exigencies of this
new, emergent nation - the reforms since 1979 have shown a certain degree of
sophistication, characterised by a spirit of self-appraisal and a greater all-round
balance in relation to the broader goals of education’ (Yip et al. 1997: 23). But this
should not obscure that fact that the economic imperatives of education were, if
anything, becoming more important as skill levels were increasing. This priority was
epitomised by the Council on Professional and Technical Education (CPTE)
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established in 1979. The role of the CPTE is to set quotas for courses in universities
and polytechnics which match the anticipated demands for different kinds of workers.
As a senior advisor suggested this ‘allocation principle’ is necessary because of a
shortage of labour as ‘there are only 50000 babies a year’. And the priority is to
ensure that there are enough technicians and engineers. The Ministry of Trade and
Industry told us that at the secondary school level ‘we don’t care if you study literature,
but you have to be good in mathematics and science’. Rationing of places is
combined with keeping the costs of science and engineering courses comparable
with arts and business studies. Students are given a preference for what they would
like to study at university and polytechnic but this is strictly determined by school
grades. ‘Those who don’t get their choice are allocated, especially to engineering’.
These students ‘are carefully monitored and given extra tuition’.
The concern about training enough engineers at the tertiary level is not only motivated
by a inherent shortage which they try to overcome by attracting foreign technicians
and engineers, but from a belief that an education for economic life is best achieved
through the Sciences rather than the Arts. As we were told by the Ministry of Labour,
’we are more worried about people adopting the softer options rather than engineers
going into business. Doing Law, Arts, etc…engineering degrees give you a lot of
systematic analytical skills…an engineer is better than a business graduate at the
first degree level. The engineer could go on to an MBA but the business graduate is
not going to become an engineer’. Such sentiments are reflected in the proportions of
university students studying engineering. In 1997 about 61 per cent of males and 28
per cent of females were studying Engineering.19
Efforts to ensure an adequate supply of technical workers was advanced in the 1980s
through the establishment of the Vocational and Industrial Training Board (VITB)
which combined the activities of the Adult Education Board and the Industry Training
Board into a single national training authority for the provision of vocational and
industrial training. This consistent effort to improve the status of technical education
and apprenticeship training reflects the generic upgrading of skills within the
workforce. Predictably, the VITB was later to be reincarnated as the Institute for
Technical Education (ITE) in 1992. The ITE which runs a number of training centres
represent state-of-the-art facilities both as a way of making training more relevant to
the needs of an advanced economy and to dampen the demand for university and
polytechnic education, as these offered the best route to the real vocational prizes.
To put these changes in context, 60 per cent of the workforce in 1979 had no
secondary education, and only 3 per cent had been educated at the tertiary level (Yip
et al. 1997: 24). This figure increased to approximately 27 per cent by 1994.20 The
low educational levels of the Singapore workforce reflects the rapid development of
the country since the mid-1960s and the poor quality of education and training prior to
the developments described in the 1970s. This has led to strenuous efforts to
improve the skills of adult workers.  The National Productivity Board (NPB)
established in the early 1970s, which became the Productivity and Standards Board
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(PSB) in 1996 under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, substantially increased its
commitment to the training of adult workers following the introduction of the Skills
Development Fund (SDF) in 1979. This tax on low-skilled work has been used to
provide finance incentives to employers to train and upgrade the skills of their
employees. In 1986 there was one training place for one in ten workers, whereas the
figure in 1998 is one in every three (PSB, 1998).21
The PSB works closely with employers, trade unions and other government agencies
to ensure the quality and relevance of in-employment training. The two interrelated
strands of its strategy are to upgrade worker skills to meet industry requirements and
to improve the utilisation of labour given that through improvements in productivity and
the introduction of new technologies, ’25 per cent of the workforce could be freed up
to do more value added jobs’ (PSB interview). Therefore, a raft of modular training
schemes where launched in the 1980s for mature workers to improve their skills.
These included Basic Education for Skill Training (BEST); Modular Skills Training
(MOST); Worker Improvement through Secondary Education (WISE) and Core Skills
for Effectiveness and Change (COSEC).
These programmes have been effective in rapidly reducing illiteracy and in lifting the
skills base of the workforce. Likewise, the educational system had been transformed
into one of the efficient factories for ‘stamping out ‘O’ and ‘A’ level candidates’
(academic interview) in the world (Green, 1999). Its success in Mathematics and
Science has been subject of world acclaim. There has also been a significant
increase in the numbers of students entering higher education.
Table Two: Graduates from Institutions of Higher Learning (number)
                                                                 1994                                 1999
Total                                                        19,057                              25,716
     Polytechnics                                       10,287                              14,641
     National Institute of Education             1,256                                1,612
     University*                                            7,514                                9,463
* National University of Singapore & Nanyang Technological University
Source:Statistics Singapore 2000 at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/Fact/SIF/sif20.html
Singapore Department of Statistics.
Indeed, much of the writing on Singapore has described these changes during the
1970s and 1980s as ‘revolutionary’. The extent of this ‘revolution’ has been
exaggerated, at least in the context of the changes that it now confronts. Until the early
1990s the model of the worker-citizen has remained largely unchanged. An increase
in the technical knowledge required to fulfil occupational tasks is not inconsistent with
the principles of the learning model based on a standardised division of labour. The
emphasis has been on following instructions and management decisions resting on a
set of rule, roles and procedures that rewarded reliable performance.
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A knowledge-driven economy depends on a different kind of worker from that
required for the mass production of standardised goods and services. This has far
reaching consequences for the occupational structure and skill formation strategy that
has served Singapore well in the last thirty years. It is not simply a question of a linear
progression with an increased number of employees requiring technical and
graduate level education and training. The change is both quantitative and qualitative.
The workforce must be willing to update their skills on a regular basis and to become
lifelong learners.22 But there is equally a need to have a workforce that is more
creative, proactive, and which has people with good problem-solving skills. As David
Lim Tik En, Singapore’s Minister of Defence has noted that ‘In a global economy, we
can stay competitive if we accumulate knowledge and use it to innovate. We have
done well for the first part - accumulating knowledge. Our past emphasis on
education and skills upgrading has given us a head start. But the second part
requires a different ethos. Being innovative is not the same as being productive. It
requires that we go beyond applying set rules and proven formulae. We have to invent
new ideas from our existing pool of knowledge. We have to think outside the box’
(1998:62).
This aspiration to ‘think outside the box’ raises the question of how to move from a
‘learning’ society in Amsden’s terms to one based on innovation. This is captured in
the idea of the ‘technopreneur’ which involves workers in established as well as newly
created businesses being able to find new ways of improving productivity or product
design. There is, after all, a big difference between entrepreneurial activity around
‘micro chips’ as opposed to ‘potato chips’ (Thurow, 1993; Lauder, 1999). The
technopreneur is someone with high level technical skills whom within a company is
‘able to move their ideas, challenge existing thinking and then keep moving, introduce
new processes, new organisation structures and so on’ (NSTB interview).
A major challenge in Singapore is to change the mindset of the workforce because
the existing momentum and role models that they see encourage them to join the
government or a large companies as ‘the environment is so safe and the
opportunities so good’ (NSTB interview). But a major element of skill formation in a
knowledge-driven economy is the development of indigenous companies, from which
they take inspiration from Switzerland and Sweden. ‘You will change the mind set by
telling them that this is the next Mount Everest to climb. This is the next challenge, that
we have already climbed this hill; working for a multinational, working for a
government  - too common…So we will want to have our engineering and science
students to understand that science and technology is no longer just the creation of
products, processes, services, but we should add one more thing, companies, the
creation of companies’  (NSTB interview).
This change in mindset is central to the new model of the worker-citizen in a boarder
sense. There is a recognition that it is impossible to create a more innovative
workforce based on a system of rote learning and close supervision. Regulation
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increasingly has to be ‘self-imposed’ as a part of ‘responsible’ rather than
‘disciplined’ activity. It is not by chance that the notion of ‘emotional intelligence’
(Goleman, 1996) has been officially sanctioned with the publication of a series of
books on various aspects of emotional intelligence at work and in everyday life, which
can be purchased from the Government Bookshop. More of the in-employment
programmes run by the PSB such as People Developer, aims at improving the
quality of human resource management and training in companies, and the CREST
programme which stands for Critical Enabling Skills Training is an attempt to develop
the non-technical skills which in the case of CREST is a national training initiative that
seeks to create a workforce able ‘to continuously adapt to change, learn new skills
and meet the challenges of the knowledge age’ (PSB, 1998).
Reforms in the education system also centre on developing problem-solving, self-
management and interpersonal skills. ‘As people are our only resource, we must
develop the potential of our students to the fullest. Our curriculum must be responsive
to current and future needs of our nation. Our students must be creative problem-
solvers, constantly seeking ways to improve what they do and with a lifelong quest for
learning’ (MOE, 1998: 30). This has led to the introduction of The Thinking Schools
Initiative, aimed at 13 and 14 year olds in the Express and Normal Academic
streams. It is not intended for less academic students found in the Normal Technical
stream, although some of these students are following this programme.
There is also a policy to reduce curriculum content by 30 per cent to allow for more
project work and teamwork in order to develop a broader range of skills (Gopinathan,
1999). Change in university entry requirements are also being introduced to reflect
the shift away from rote learning and producing a nation of ‘great copiers’ in a system
‘drowning in information, gasping for knowledge’.23 It is proposed that by 2002 A-
level grades will account for 75 per cent of the entry criteria to university, with the
introduction of the American Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) (to be modified for
Singapore students) accounting for the remaining 25 per cent. There is also the
possibility of bonus points being awarded for extra-curricula activities, although the
exact basis on which such awards are to made reminds unclear. By 2004 A-level
grades are set to decline to 65 per cent of the entry criteria as 10 per cent will be
awarded for project work.24
Alongside these initiatives the Ministry of Education has introduced a programme of
National Education, ‘Our education system should not be judged solely by the number
of A’s our students get in major national examinations, nor by the high standing of our
students in international comparisons of science and mathematics achievements.
Equally important is the quality of the people the education system produces - their
integrity and character; their attitude towards work, their ability to be team-players,
and their sense of responsibility and commitment to society’ (MOE, 1998: 58). The
need to inculcate a sense of what it means to be Singaporian reflects the increasing
problem of finding a new balance between greater personal freedom in what people
think and do, with a concern to maintain social discipline and cohesion. Therefore, it
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is to the ‘pressure points’ (Brown, 1999) that will shape the future of skill formation in
Singapore we now turn.
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Section Two: Possibilities and Challenges
Globalisation and the Role of the Developmental State
If some of the leading pundits of globalisation where to be believed (Ohmae, 1996) it
is not only the ‘developmental model’ but the nation state which is in crisis. However,
our analysis suggests that such accounts are misleading (Brown and Lauder,
2000).25 One problem is that commentators in the West continue to have
considerable problem breaking free of the mentally of the Cold War - the free market
versus the command economy. One of the consequences has been, as noted earlier,
a failure to understand the skill formation strategies of Japan and the Tiger
Economies (World Bank 1993; Wade, 1990). Rather than undermine the role of the
state in Singapore, globalisation has ensured the viability of the PAP. If this had been
left to the market, companies may well have invested in Singapore in the 1970s and
1980s but there would have been little incentive to lift skill levels or spread prosperity
throughout the population. In the current context, as its regional neighbours and China
(with a population of over 1.2 billion) actively compete for inward investment,
Singapore would find itself having to reduce wages and costs in order to attract new
investment or to retain the MNCs already located in Singapore.
There is no evidence that Singapore is about to abandon its developmental strategy
based on ‘governing the market’ (Wade, 1990), as a result of more intense global
competition. It continues to be extremely successful in developing strategic
employment clusters through the work of the EDB. It has defined these clusters in
broad enough terms to avoid the problem of being dependent on one or two industrial
sectors that would make a small economy like Singapore vulnerable to global
volatility, such as when the market price of memory chips took a precipitous drop in
the 1990s. The idea of ‘governing the market’ offers a useful point of comparison with
countries such as Britain and the United States that highlight the virtues of being
‘governed by the market’ (Brown, 1999). Manifestly the PAP in Singapore does not
full control its domestic economy, let alone impact on the global economy, given its
heavy dependence on ‘foreign’ MNCs. It must constantly address the enlightened
self-interest of companies with reference to new market opportunities in Singapore or
elsewhere in the region. This is relatively easier to achieve when companies can see
the benefits of production or service delivery close to the market place, but the same
logic does not apply so really in the case of research, design and development,
where proximity to regional markets is less compelling. The MNCs are reluctant to
diffuse state of the art technologies for the purposes of domestic skill development.
Much of the research and development undertaken by the MNCs remains close to the
‘home’ base. Singapore has the added problem of a weak research infrastructure
(Hang Chang Chieh, 1998). But unless it can develop its R&D capability it will
become more vulnerable to regional competitors such as Malaysia who are
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continuing to up-grade their skills base into technical areas with lower wage costs.
Singapore now confronts the problem of losing its competitive advantage in terms of
skill when neighbouring countries can offer the same skilled workers at a lower price,
as South-East Asian countries seek to move up the value chain. Singapore is already
finding it difficult to maintain a quarter of the workforce in manufacturing employment,
due to price competition. This as we have seen has led to a greater emphasis on
exportable services such as education, health, media and the arts (see Table Two).
Table Three: Change in Industrial Composition and Average Earnings by
Sector
:
                                                               1987        1997                         1987                 1997                    % change
                                                                                                    Monthly Average Earnings (real) S$        Annual
Average
Manufacturing                                        26.7         22.6                          1168                   2282                      7.7
Commerce                                              23.4         21.8                          1131                   1916                      8.0
Transport and Communication             10.2         11.5                          1510                   2368                      8.0
Financial and Business Services             8.9          14.9                          1810                   2756                      8.7
Community and Personal Services       21.5         21.3                          1620                   2363                      8.2
Others                                                       9.3           7.9                            na                        na
Source: Report on the Labour Force Survey of Singapore 1997, Research and Statistics Department, Ministry of
Labour 1998 p.ix. Average Monthly Earnings derived from Table 2.2 p.18 1997 Singapore Yearbook of Manpower
Statistics, Manpower Research and Statistics Department, Ministry of Manpower, 1998. Figures of percentage
change in total wage increase based on table 2.8 p.72 Singapore Yearbook of Manpower Statistics, Manpower
Research and Statistics Department, Ministry of Manpower, 1998.
In the West it is common to hear politicians and business leader state that corporate
ownership is unimportant, because what really matters is the quality of jobs that
companies bring to the domestic economy. In some respects Singapore testifies to
the validity of such claims, but it also demonstrates the vulnerability of becoming too
dependent on jobs provided by ‘foreign’ companies. We have described Singapore’s
response as a one nation, dual economy, based on a vital state within Singapore and
a virtual state in the region. The extension of the ‘external wing’ is part of a strategy to
develop its own indigenous business by facilitating their expansion into international
markets. This is part of a longstanding problem of Singapore’s reliance on MNCs
who are located in the City-State for instrumental rather than affective reasons. The
attempt to develop its own World-Class Companies is an attempt to ‘lock in’ high
value activities and jobs, which would also make Singapore less vulnerable to the
whims of foreign MNCs. It is also based on a recognition that if it is going to succeed
in developing indigenous capability in R&D and business hub activities it will need to
achieve a rapid expansion of Singaporian companies.
Low (1998:177) has noted that the government has primarily had to deal with non-
Singaporian business leaders and there are ‘strict conditions laid down for non-
interference with domestic politics which suit MNCs which have no preoccupations
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other than the bottom line’. But if the government is successful in developing a critical
mass of medium and large companies the voice of business may become more
powerful. However it should always be remembers that most things in Singapore
happen ‘by design’ and the state has taken an active involvement in developing
companies which will continue to maintain close contacts to government, ensuring
that business leaders are fully involved in the consensus building process.
However, the biggest threat to the future of skill formation in Singapore stem from
inherent tensions within its developmental strategy as a whole. The nature of these
problems will become clear in the following analysis, but they stem from attempts to
transform Singapore from a ‘paradigm of late industrialization through learning’
(Amsden, 1989: 4), based on borrowed technologies, technical training, rule following
and worker discipline to a paradigm of a knowledge-driven economy with its
emphasis on innovation, research, technopreneurialism and self-management.
Upgrading the Skills of the Workforce.
A major strength of skill formation in Singapore has been its ability to coordinate the
supply and demand for workers within a virtuous circle of skills upgrading. Ashton and
Sung argue that this correspondence between education, training and economic
growth holds the key to understanding Singapore’s economic competitiveness. But
as high value added employment comes to depend on a different kind of worker from
that required for the mass production of standardised goods and services,
Singapore’s skill formation strategy now confronts new challenges. To date,
education, training and employment opportunities have been tightly coordinated by
the state allocating education and training places to meet the perceived needs of
employers in each of the major industrial clusters that form part of the countries
competitive strategy.
Flexibility within the labour market has been achieved through a system of ‘guest
workers’ to undertake the jobs that Singaporians do not want to do and a ‘foreign
talent scheme’ to attract high skilled workers to undertake profession, managerial or
technical jobs which can not be filled by Singaporians or in fields where there is little
indigenous expertise. Approximately 25 percent of the workforce fall into these
categories although the majority are low skilled workers attracted by high wages
relative to wage rates in their home countries.
There is little training provided for these low-skilled workers, who are expected to
‘return home’ after two years. This significant reserve army of labour has given
Singapore a healthy buffer in periods of unemployment. If there is economic downturn
these workers could be repatriated early which has allowed the state to maintain its
commitment to full employment for the indigenous workforce. However, in the late
1990s unemployment in Singapore rose to 7 per cent. This was due to geo-politics
problems where the government found it difficult to exploit the labour market flexibility
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which derives from it foreign worker policy. Given its geo-political vulnerability it was
decided to defer repatriation of low skilled guest workers in an attempt to stabilise
political relations with neighbouring countries that have been hard-hit by the 1997
financial crisis.
The problem of finding employment for low-skilled Singaporians has also become
more acute with the rapid shift from low to high value business, associated with rising
labour costs. Along with other developed economies it confronts the problem of a
lack of low-skilled, but moderately waged jobs, previously found in manufacturing.
Many of these low skilled Singaporians are over forty and have no secondary
education. There are currently 41 percent of those aged over forty with no secondary
education and this will remain at 36 percent in 2010. At the same time the numbers of
workers over forty will increase by 28 percent during the same period (Pious, 1998).
These workers represent around a quarter of Singapore’s workforce.
This problem reflects the growing problem of ‘structural’ unemployment and economic
polarisation (see below) in Singapore. As the economy restructures the skills of these
older workers will be inadequate to meet the requirements of new employment
opportunities. Lim Swee Say anticipates a problem of ‘structural under-employment’,
where workers retrenched from the consumer electronics sector are not moving into
new growth sectors such as wafer fabrication, ‘We do face a real threat of structural
unemployment in Singapore because of the large number of unskilled workers in our
workforce and the fast pace of economic restructuring’ (1998:41). The problem
involved in upgrading the skills of these workers has been long standing, which the
Productivity and Standards Board (PSB) has been energetically attempting to
alleviate. The difficulty is that the standard of basic education is low and has meant
that most programmes initiated by the PSB for older workers have been rudimentary.
The numbers involved in training programmes continues to be impressive but it has
not resolved the problem of older low-skilled workers.
However, the response to worker retrenchments at the end of the 1990s reflects the
strength of Singapore’s approach to ‘joined-up’ government. It is recognised that
unemployment is always a politically sensitive issue that conflicts with the aspirations
of the trade union movement. In response the National Trade Union Congress
(NTUC) was given responsibility for delivering the Skills Redevelopment Programme.
The aim of the Redevelopment Programme is to identify workers whose jobs are
being restructured or retrenched to follow a training course before these changes
occur in order to prepare them to fulfil their new job tasks or to improve their chances
of finding another job. The key sectors where training is to be undertaken is decided
by the NTUC in conjunction with the appropriate government departments such as the
EDB, rather than by the companies who are not seen to have the same time
perspective or understanding of the economy as a whole. Indeed the aim is to match
retrenched workers on these programmes with new job opportunities in other
companies. The incentive for companies is that they receive a subsidy of 70 per cent
of training costs.
23
There is also a realisation that although it has been successful in getting the MNCs to
upgrade the skills of workers, it will not be able to prevent the restructuring of
companies as the MNCs pursue policies of global integration. Therefore, there is an
acknowledgement that company restructuring along the lines of Anglo-Saxon
capitalism is taking place in Singapore. This will lead to a widespread change in the
employment contract for many Singaporeans. MNCs, especially from the US, are
likely to adopt the same model of organisational restructuring that they operate in
their home market. This will mean fewer ‘core’ jobs and a greater use of outside
contractors to deliver none essential activities. This will lead to a reduction in job
security and the need for employees to maintain their ‘employability’ in both inside the
company and in the external job market (Brown, 1994). The problem this poses for
Singapore’s skill formation strategy is that the labour market will become more fluid
and volatile. It may also make it more difficult to predict the skill demands in specific
areas of economic activity.
These problems of regulation are related to the way the state, through the offices of
the CPVE, channel students through the education and training system. The rationale
for the tight restrictions on entry into university is that it is a small country of around 3
million people, therefore it must ensure a tight fit between the education and labour
market opportunities.  As we were informed, ‘one graduate unemployed is one
graduate too many’.26 Until recently it has targeted intermediate vocational skills as
the key to Singapore’s prosperity and has adopted various means to enhance the
image of the polytechnics, which take students from the age of 16 for studies at a
sub-degree level. These polytechnics are equipped with state of the art technologies
to ensure both high quality training and to symbolise the status attached to
technological education. The investment in state of the art equipment is equally true
for Institute for Technical Education (ITE), geared towards technical training for those
with modest academic records.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry imposes a workforce planning model to determine
how many place are to be available for each programme in what institution (i.e.
university, polytechnic or ITE). Such an approach is unpopular with many middle class
parents who are unable to get their children into Singapore’s two universities. The
response has been to send students to study at universities in North America, Europe
and the Antipodes (approx 10,000 at any one time). Whether it is possible to regulate
the educational and occupational aspirations of the middle classes in the future is a
moot point. It will continue to depend on whether the economy can generate decent
jobs that offer career prospects for polytechnic students. But what is perceived as a
‘good’ job to parents living in a society that has experienced rapid economic develop
compared to their children is different. University is seen to be a rite of passage for
middle class youth into managerial and professional occupations. These pressures
may be alleviated to some extent by the need to develop Singapore’s research and
development (R&D) capability. If this is to become more than a token gesture in a
knowledge economy it will involve the polytechnics as well as the universities being
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involved in research and design activities. This may lead to polytechnics being given
university status, able to award undergraduate and postgraduate qualifications.
Issues of how the Singapore government attempt to develop and regulate the social
and economic aspirations of the young as part of it overarching skill formation is also
closely linked to the changing model of the worker-citizen. But before examining that
issue we need to consider the challenges presented by distributional issues of ‘who
gets what’? This, in turn, is related to the level of social trust required for a nation to
become a knowledge-driven economy.
Social Cohesion, Opportunity and Skill Formation
It is often argued that an important feature of the economic development of Japan and
the Asian Tigers is a high level of social cohesion or trust, reflected in smaller income
differentials than those found in the United States and Britain. High levels of social
trust are seen to be beneficial to skill development as individuals and families feel a
strong sense of personal and collective responsibility to achieve at school and
upgrade skills when required. Therefore, issues of skill are closely related to those of
rewards, status and social justice: to questions of who gets what? This ‘skills nexus’
between economic efficiency and social justice has been central to Singapore’s
developmental strategy. It has successfully linked both the legitimating strategies of
nation states identified by Castells, namely Singapore as a ‘societal project’, aimed
at building a viable city-state against the odds, and legitimation based on ‘society-as-
it-is’ (delivering prosperity, democracy, quality of life).  Indeed, Castells (1996) warns
against western ethnocentrism by assuming that legitimation can be measured by the
level of democratic participation in society.
Singapore, however, has a pattern of income inequalities more akin to the United
States rather than Japan. The problem in Singapore is that little attempt has been
made to restrict the pay of ‘symbolic analysts’ working for MNCs (Reich, 1991).
Equally, the government has been committed to equality of opportunity not equality.
This commitment to rewarding male talent is reflected in the incomes of Government
officials. Figures compiled by the World Competitiveness Report, 1996 show that the
Political Chief Executive in Singapore is compensated to the tune of US$812,858,
this is over twice the amount paid in the US, Japan, Germany, and the UK. Cabinet
Ministers in Singapore received US$574,476; Legislators US$65,174, and Senior
Civil Servants US$292,714, these figures compare with an average salary of
US$14,459 for manufacturing employees. On the World Competitiveness Report’s
Altruism Index, which is the salary of the political chief executive divided by that of
manufacturing employees, the ratio is 56.2 for Singapore, 6.2 in the US, 8.2 in Japan,
8.4 in Germany and 5.3 in the UK (Low, 1998:214). The scale of these income
differentials reflects a broader pattern of income inequalities. The distribution of
household income of the bottom 20 per cent when compared as a ratio of that
received by the top 20 per cent reveals Singapore to be even more unequal that the
25
United States of America. The ratio for Singapore is 13.7, 13.2 in the US, and 8.3 in
Britain. The comparable ratios for Japan is 2.7 and 5.3 in Taiwan. 27
However, the Singapore government has been able to maintain a high degree of
social cohesion because it has succeeded in ‘raising all the boats’. Full employment
has enabled virtually everyone to have a job if they entered the labour market.
Through a process of skills upgrading and productivity improvements significant
wage increases have been achieved across all the major industrial sectors. These
have averaged around 8 per cent, per annum. Coupled with significant increases in
house prices spread throughout the population, it is not surprising that the scale of
inequalities in Singapore have yet to have a serious impact on the social capacity for
learning, innovation and productivity.
Equally, although there is a relatively low rate of personal tax in Singapore (28 per
cent) and the absence of a western style welfare state, there is a significant
redistribution of income based on the Asian proverb ‘it is better to teach them to fish
than to give them fish’ (Government of Singapore, 1991:118). This has been used to
legitimate major investment in housing, health care and education based on co-
payment to maintain a sense of contribution rather than simply one of ‘rights’ to
services.28 A heavily subsidised system of public housing is, for instance, offering
everyone the opportunity of owning their own home (84% in the early 1990s), with
government funded up-grades of older housing estates. The welfare of the population
is also maintained through a social security net in the form of the Central Provident
Fund (CPF) which is compulsory for both employees and employers to contribute
approximately 20 per cent each of waged income (as a response to the Asian
financial crisis employers contribution were reduced by 10 per cent).29
CPF provides for a pension in old age, major illness, incapacity or premature death
of a breadwinner, it can also be use to help towards buying a home and for
educational purposes. Those on low incomes receive top-up payments into their CPF
for instance in the form of Edusave, which is a scheme to help children from low
income families meet the costs of school fees from the age of 6 to 16 years. There is
also a Student Welfare Fund to help needy children. For those who are not covered
by the CPF there is Public Assistance (PA), which is ‘provided to help the financially
distressed regain their independence. It is not intended as an unemployment,
retirement or disability support. The numbers receiving this form of assistance was
less that one per cent of the population (1,960 in 1997), which represents a reduction
from 2,934 in 1987.30
Chua Beng Huat suggests that ‘for the first 25 years of rapid economic growth, the
rate of upward mobility has been very rapid across the entire population. This was
largely because of the relatively homogeneously ‘poor’ - not only in wealth but also in
education attainment’ (1999; p.216). But a class structuring has been developing in
Singapore despite efforts by the PAP to use social and economic policies as a way
of correcting some of the fragmentary consequences of market capitalism. This he
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suggests has become more conspicuous with the rise in consumer spending,
especially in terms of housing and cars, ‘the intensification of inequalities have been
submerged under two conceptual frames of organizing the Singapore society,
namely, the idea of ‘meritocracy’ and the idea of ethnicity or race’ (pp.215-6).
The vision of Singapore as a multiracial society is sacrosanct. The official view is that
all ethnic groups have rich, comfortable and poor, as each group is vertically
integrated as a social unity through a shared ‘traditional’ culture (Chua, 1999: 217).
This is given institutional expression in the ‘community self-help’ organisations where
the wealthy are expected to contribute to the welfare of the needy within one’s own
racial group. Chua notes that ‘each racial group has been encouraged to look at their
economic position at any one point in time with reference to their own past rather than
to compare themselves across the racial divisions’ (p.217). His conclusion is that the
government has largely succeeded, as ‘it had become clear that racial background
was no longer an important criterion for determining poverty’ (1999:217).
Nevertheless, the General Household Survey of 1995 continued to reveal ethnic
differences in the monthly income of workers. The lowest income category included
those with incomes below S$500 per month, this accounted for 4%, 7.2% and 12%
for Chinese, Indian and Malays respectively. The comparable figures for the highest
earner category (those receiving S$3000 or over) were 23.1%, 19.1% and 6.4%.31
However, the main ethnic tensions that are likely to arise in Singapore stem from the
spill-over from ethnic conflicts in Indonesia.
The impact of socio-economic inequalities on Singapore’s commitment to
meritocratic competition does present a major challenge to its skill formation
strategy. The ideology of meritocracy is deeply ingrained in Singapore as it tries to
keep alive the Singaporian Dream of social improvement for oneself, one’s family
and the society as a whole. When meritocracy is able to operate in a context of
economic growth and full employment it can be seen as both a neutral way of judging
contestants and to lead to greater equality of outcome, in the sense that more middle
class jobs are created. The problem at the end of the century is that meritocratic
competition operates in a different labour market context. There is more inequality
between occupational positions, along with problems of unemployment or
underemployment, which greatly exaggerate the consequences of success or failure
in the competition for credentials. The more the stakes are seen to increase the more
intensive ‘positional’ competition between individuals, families and social classes will
become (Hirsch, 1977; Brown, forthcoming). There is a real danger of growing rigidity
in Singapore’s class structure unless it can find ways of limited the competitive
advantage of middle class families in the competitions for certificates and jobs.
As the Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong has noted that whilst ‘meritocracy
underpins the entire Singapore system…equal opportunities generate unequal
outcomes. As our society matures, in the absence of periodic shake-ups, these
inequalities will become more marked…We must manage these natural differences
properly, and not let them be reinforced by social distinctions and barriers. Otherwise,
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we will accentuate the natural fault lines in our society and generate powerful
divergent pulls’ (1998:5). But there are signs that despite the successful performance
of Singapore schools in international attainment tests, class rigidities may develop.
One of the problems is that the tight controls on access to university leads to intensive
competition for university places which will make it especially difficult for students
from disadvantaged backgrounds to demonstrate their ‘talents’ relative to fellow
competitors.
This elitism is endemic within the administrative class. Even the Deputy Secretary-
General of the NTUC, Lim Swee Say who is often insightful about the political
economy of Singapore fails to understand the consequences of even greater
diversification in Singapore schools. He suggests that in an information economy
‘Social intelligence will become more important in preparing young Singaporeans for
the fast-changing world of the future. Even though our education system is one of the
best in the world…academic performance is not everything. Interpersonal skills and
thinking skills are equally, if not more, important in the future world…the emphasis
should shift from Intelligence Quotient to what has been referred to as the Emotion
Quotient. The Government has set up independent schools to adopt new and
innovative teaching methods. It has also identified the nurturing of an innovative
mindset as a new thrust in our education system. It may be timely now for us to go one
step further to review and expand the roles of private schools, which now admit only
foreign students, and allow them to compete for Singaporian students’ (Schein,
1996:174). The consequence would be a marketisation of education, where the
ability to pay would accentuate socio-economic inequalities.
Such issues are important because the success of economic nationalism since the
1960s has been a vital source of social cohesion. Singaporian’s have put their trust in
the PAP because it has delivered the ‘goods’. However, more conspicuous
educational, social and economic inequalities may make it harder to convince all
sections of society to maintain their social discipline. But this is to pose an intriguing
question for comparative analysis, because the relationship between social cohesion
and economic competitiveness is historically variable.  What is required in conditions
of Fordism may be different from that required in the knowledge-driven economy
Singapore is now trying to create.  In conditions of Fordism, social cohesion
becomes a source of productivity gain when it can contribute to a workforce that is
committed, disciplined, hardworking, and able to accurately learn and copy routine
ways of doing things.  However, if people are expected to be creative problem-
solvers; self-managers; enterprising, and lifelong learners, it involves more than a
change in mindset. It involves institutionalised relations of trust (Fox, 1974; Baron, et
al., 2000), which assume a high degree of individual discretion and freedom that
have been largely absent in Singapore.  Therefore, the question is to what extent will
Singapore require a wholesale change in its social and political institutions to
generate the kinds of workers it now believes to be essential to economic
competitiveness? This takes us to the challenges it now confronts in its attempt to
transform the model of the worker-citizen.
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Engineering the ‘New’ Worker-Citizen for a Knowledge-Driven Economy
We have described how the Singapore government has recognised that to become a
knowledge-driven economy it is no longer sufficient to maintain a ‘learning’ model
(Amsden, 1989). Economic competitiveness is now seen to depend on a different
kind of worker from that required for the mass production of standardised goods and
services. As in Western economies a greater emphasis is placed on individual
creativity, pro-activity, self-management and problem-solving skills. This is captured
in the idea of the technopreneur where workers in established, as well as in nascent
businesses, are able to find new ways of improving productivity, design, products or
services to compete in the global market.
Debates about the changing model of the worker-citizen in Singapore also centre on
the impact of global communications and the growth of E-commerce. There was little
prospect of Singapore becoming a business hub unless it had sophisticated
communication networks. When A Vision of an Intelligent Island: IT2000 Report was
published in 1992 the full commercial potential of E-commerce (doing business
through the internet) was not fully recognised. The government was hopeful of creating
an Intranet that could be used to regulate access to the Internet. Control of the media
ensured that opposition voices against the PAP government were muted, but the
Internet has proved to be impossible to regulate despite attempts to keep some of
the ‘highways clean’ (Chye & Mahizhnan, 1998). Singaporian’s now have access to
views about their political leaders, country and lifestyles that may directly contradict
the views of the PAP. The concern is that this will fuel demands for greater personal
freedom that could undermine the social discipline and work ethic on which the
‘survival’ of Singapore is still seen to depend. At the same time, large numbers of
Singaporians are leaving to study, work and play in other countries. This exposure to
alternative social, moral and cultural standards further limits the scope of the
government to regulate the ideas and behaviour of the people. The introduction of
National Education represents an attempt to bolster nation building, along with the
establishment of the Singapore International Foundation to facilitate contact with and
between Singaporians living abroad, including building primary schools for
expatriates, satellite television and a world service radio station (Rodan, 1996).
Hence whereas nation building and economic modernisation operated in tandem
they are now in creative tension if not conflict. Globalisation and the creation of
Singapore as a communications hub has made it more difficult to regulate the
behaviour of the population as they travel the globe by plane or via the internet. The
metaphor of the ‘hotel’ society captures this, as the issue of what it means to be
Singaporian assumes greater significance at the same time that economic change
suggests a need for personal empowerment and ‘democratic’ participation.
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This has led to a paradox at the heart of Singapore’s skill formation strategy. Its
previous success has been founded on the quality of its administration, especially in
the economic sphere. Lee Kuan Yew recognised the importance of having
outstanding people in the civil service. As we were told by a senior government
advisor the people who run the system have to be more intelligent that those they are
regulating, ‘we need to be smarter that the smartest captains of industry’. EDB staff
energetically circumnavigated the global in search of the best ideas, latest
technologies, foreign talent to help Singapore become one of the most successful
economies in the world. The administration is conversant with the latest business and
economic ideas as management gurus from around the world go to Singapore to
share their deliberations about the future. This has created a culture in which
Singaporians are expected to follow rather than lead in these new innovations. There
is constant talk about changing the mindset of ordinary Singaporians to show greater
initiative, but there is little recognition that this will only succeed if there is a
fundamental power shift from the top.
The attempt to transform the way people are to be socialised and disciplined for a
knowledge-driven economy, collides with the view that ‘if economic development is
the ultimate goal, discipline and conformity cannot be dismissed to lightly over the
preference for individualism and freedom’ (Low, 1998: 27). But if the Singapore
government is serious about developing an entrepreneurial rather than an
employment culture it will need to find a new balance between the role of the elite civil
service and the ideas, views and aspirations of the population as a whole. This in turn
not only raises questions of political leadership or of institution building, but also
questions of culture. To what extent do ‘Asian’ cultural values impede the
development of the creative empowerment of the individual?
These tensions are reflected in recent changes to key aspects of the school
curriculum. The Thinking Schools initiative (MOE, 1998), is intended to reduce the
extent of rote learning by giving students space in the school day to reflect on what
they are learning (Gopinathan, 1998). Unsurprisingly, the extent of these changes
have to date been limited, after all the educational achievement of students in
Singapore are as good as anywhere in the world when measured in terms of
standardised tests for maths and science. Many teachers are reluctant to move away
from tried and tested teaching methods which leave little room for ambiguity in the
authority relations between teachers and taught.
The Thinking Schools programme aims to give students an average of one 35 minute
session per week, although the idea is to infuse creative thinking through the
education system. The introduction of the ‘Thinking’ programme in this format reflects
the difficulty of introducing it into an educational system where there is an awareness
that in other respects it is seen as very successful. Given that children at a young age
have a natural curiosity that leads them to ask questions conducive to the
development of creativity, it is surprising that the Thinking programme has not been
introduced at the primary level. The reason is that it is best suited to those children in
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the older primary years but this is a crucial time when students are streamed for
secondary education. Equally, at the secondary level once students move into the
third year of secondary education they begin to prepare for their ‘O’ levels.
Interference with the streaming and examination process is something that the
Ministry of Education is reluctant to initiate.
Equally, one of the obvious ways of reflecting the importance of project work and
problem solving skills is to change the content of A level examinations. There seems
little desire to undertake this task, although there are those who view it as a logic
extension of education in a knowledge-driven economy. There are also no plans to
limit the number of A-levels students can take, which means that the students will
continue to extend their academic studies to win an advantage in a highly competitive
market for university education. If the desire is to allow more time for project work and
reward ‘thinking’ skills rather than rote learning, limiting the number of A levels
students can study is an obvious policy option.
There are also important differences in the way concepts such as empowerment,
critical thinking and creativity are understood in Singapore compared to Europe or
North America. The Western definition of creativity is to be inventive and imaginative;
to be able to create. In the West this has become an art form where we can now study
the creative arts. In schools, art is taught as a means to self-expression and
imagination. But in Singapore, Art was not included as one of the core subjects
included in the ‘thinking’ schools curriculum, these were History, Geography, Maths,
Science and English. They are operating with a technicist framework of ‘creativity’
which involves teaching a methodology based on what can best be described as
rational problem-solving. The emphasis is on how to collect, marshal and interpret
information in the development of a habit of mind which brings together critical
thinking (which means questioning), creative thinking (which means thinking about a
problem in different ways) and self-regulation (which means working towards the
greater good of the family, company and the nation). This understanding of based on
Edward de Bono’s Lateral Thinking rather than John Dewey’s broader notion of
reflective thought (Dewey, 1916).
Dewey is interesting here because he neatly captured the problem that now confronts
Singapore. For the last thirty years it is not only the nature of work which has
encouraged the development of expert followers, but also the organisation of a skill
formation system based on the development of a elite civil service of the ‘brightest
and the best’. This clearly conforms to Lee Kuan Yew’s that ‘Singapore is a
meritocracy…men have risen to the top by their own merits, hard work, and high
performance. Together they are a closely knit and coordinated hard core. If all 300
were to crash in one jumbo jet, then Singapore will disintegrate. That shows how
small the base is for our leadership in politics, economics, and security. We have to,
and we will, enlarge this base.’32 They could now probably fill two jumbo jets as they
continue to operate with a very tight network of core personnel. But the down side of
this approach is that it harbours a ‘dim view of ability’ among the general population
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(Brown and Lauder, 2001). The restricted access to university education in
Singapore not only reflects the perceived demands of the labour market, but the
limited intellectual capacities of large numbers of Singaporians. This is also reflected
in its foreign talent programmes. It may be this view of intelligence which is most
dramatically in need of changing (Gopinathan, 1999). As we were told by a senior
advisor in a key government department, creativity and innovation is for 10 per cent of
the workforce, ‘it has to be like this. We should not be fooled by our own rhetoric. It’s a
reality of life that people have different potentials’ so ultimately there is little point
‘squeezing water out of rock’.
Such ideas are deeply ingrained in Singapore’s education, social and economic
institutions. In the document Learning to Think, Thinking to Learn (MOE, 1998) the
Ministry of Education outlines its ideas on the thinking schools programme to create
the new model worker/citizens of the future. But what underpins this is a close
adherence to the ‘three kinds of mind, three kinds of work’ model inherited from
industrial Fordism in the early twentieth century. This document notes the role of the
Institute of Technical Education (ITE) is geared towards those at the bottom end of
the cognitive order ‘to ensure that its graduates have the technical knowledge and
skills that are relevant to industry. As our industries move up the skill ladder, they will
need highly skilled workers at all levels. ITE graduates will help to make the difference
in sustaining Singapore’s international competitiveness’ (MOE, 1998: 51). The
polytechnics students enter at the age of sixteen for studies below graduate level, are
clearly targeted at the technically minded, ‘Polytechnic graduates are valued as
practice-oriented and knowledgeable middle level professions, much sought after by
industry. Polytechnic graduates enter the workforce at line and supervisory levels and
after 10 to 15 years, many move on to fill the middle and upper management layers in
all sectors of the industries’ (MOE, 1998:51). The universities are geared towards the
cognitive elite in all sectors of industry, ‘Our universities will strive to become world-
class universities. They will provide a rounded yet vigorous education to potential
leaders who will contribute to Singapore’ (MOE, 1998: 51).
Due to its ability to deliver prosperity an unintended consequence of the government
elite being left to govern is that it has encouraged the kind of ‘trained incapacity’ that
the political leadership now recognised to be challenged for economic reasons.
Dewey writes that ‘In an autocratically managed society, it is often a conscious object
to prevent the development of freedom and responsibility; a few do the planning and
ordering, the others follow directions and are deliberately confined to narrow and
prescribed channels of endeavour. However much such a scheme may inure to the
prestige and profit of a class, it is evident that it limits the development of the subject
class; hardens and confines the opportunities for learning through experience of the
master class, and in both ways hampers the life of the society as a whole’
(1916:363). Hence a key comparative question is the relationship between high skills
and democracy as they appear to be more closely related in knowledge based
economies, but this need not necessary imply a western model, individuation need
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not be the same thing as market individualism (Durkheim, 1933; Brown and Lauder
2001)
33
Conclusion
What has been achieved in Singapore is little short of remarkable. It’s approach  to skill
formation has lessons for both developed and developing economies, such as the
importance of having a high quality, efficiency civil service; its approach to joined-up
government; its economic foresight planning through the auspices of the EDB; and the
quality of its technical education and training.
A further strength of its skill formation strategy is its location at the heart of Singapore as
a ‘societal’ project. And any fundamental shift in this project would have profound
implications for the future of Singapore. It has enabled all the boats to rise despite
significant inequalities between socio-economic groups. The upgrading of skills has
been successfully linked to housing, health, education, environmental and welfare
policies. However, it may become more difficult to keep older, poorer educated workers
from capsizing given that companies are reluctant to pay relatively high wages to low
skilled workers when these jobs can be done more cheaply in neighbouring countries.
Alternative low skilled service sector employment tends to be poorly remunerated and
many of these workers who have experienced rising living standards for many years will
feel that these jobs are beneath them. The demographic problem of an ageing
population would appear to aggravate this situation. However, the one nation, dual
economy strategy is likely to generate financial resources that will be required to
support older workers and the elderly through a system of social welfare.
How far Singapore moves towards a more open ‘democracy’ clearly has implications
for the organisation of skill formation. It is unclear whether its developmental
approach, involving tightly integrated government departments and the meshing
together of the supply and demand for labour, could be maintained when individuals
have greater scope for personal initiative. There will be no democratic ‘big bang’ in
Singapore, but there are at least attempts being made to test the ‘democratic’ waters
in response to the demands of e-commerce and the Internet; changing skill sets; and
growing calls from the middle classes to assume greater control over their lives at
least in the area of cultural consumption. There may, however, be more scope to
loosen the reigns of centralised power without any significant impact on its economic
strategy. Indeed, we have suggested that an extension of personal freedoms may
prove to be a prerequisite to release the creative and entrepreneurial talent it now
suggests are required. Paradoxically, the main threat to the PAP’s skill formation
strategy, ceteris paribus is likely to come from the growth of an indigenous business
class who are likely to call for an extension of market forces in education, housing,
and public amenities. Unless there is an increase in the personal degrees of freedom
the political appeal of the business class will be linked to ‘setting the people free’
from government interference.
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Lastly, it is unclear what proportion of the workforce need the creative, self-
management and enterprise skills that are assumed to go hand-in-glove with a
knowledge-driven economy. What is clearly is that Singapore is not a high skills
economy but it has a high skills strategy. Equally, the pundits of global convergence
who harbour a neo-liberal free model of world development will continue to be
frustrated by Singapore’s approach to developmental capitalism. Its rapid return to
growth after the Asian financial crisis suggests that its approach is robust when set to
sea in the gale of destructive capitalism!
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1 Between the middle of 1997 and 1998 the Singapore dollar fell 16 per cent against the
value of its US equivalent, and the Singapore stock market fell by 54 per cent. By the
end of 1998 the economy was barely growing at all, but has since enjoyed robust
economic growth.
2 See Koh, T. (1998) ‘Size is not destiny’, Appendix 1, p.181, in A.Mahizhnan & Lee.
Tsao Yuan (Eds.) Singapore: Re-engineering Success, Oxford University Press.
3 The fact that Singapore did not start from an ‘agrarian or raw material base’ led
Alice Amsden to argue that Singapore does not fit this paradigm.3 Although
modern day Singapore began as a entrepot economy and as a military hub for the
British, it appears to have much in common with the development of the other
Asian Tiger countries. Indeed, Ashton et al (1999) have argued that Singapore
represents the archetypal model of what they call ‘developmental skill formation’.
4 The idea of ‘pressure points’ and ‘trade offs’ is discussed in the paper, along with our
definition of skill formation as the social capacity for learning, innovation and
productivity. The ideas presented in this paper also relate to our theory of ‘collective
intelligence’ (Brown and Lauder , 2001). See also Brown, P., Green, A., and Lauder, H.
(forthcoming) High Skills: A Comparative Study of Globalization, Competitiveness
and Skill Formation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5 To Western observers it may seem surprise to note the direct absence of the sectional
interests of capital and labour not being the basis for a political settlement based on the
prospect of prosperity for all and the upgrading of skills.
6 Lee Kuan Yew in Straits Times 23 March 1996. Quoted in L.Low (1998) The Political
Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore, Singapore: Oxford University
Press, p.218.
7 Philip Yeo is CEO of the EDB, Singapore. Quoted in Edgar, Schein 1996 Strategic
Pragmatism: the culture of Singapore’s Economic Development Board, Cambridge,
Mass: MIT, p.162. He also observed, ‘Economic development means job creation. Jobs
create prosperity and the rest, quality of life, etc., follow. It you have no jobs, there is no
quality of life to speak of. No higher standard of living to aspire to,  ibid., p.114.
8 During the same period Agriculture and quarrying fell from 7.1 per cent of
employment to under 1 per cent in the 1980s. However, the service sector
encompassing commerce, financial and business services, transport and
communications accounted for almost 70 per cent of employment in the early 1960s,
declining to 63.2 per cent in the 1980s only to recover to the approximately 70 per
cent in the mid-1990s. See Table 2.1 Real GDP, Industrial Structure and Employment
by Phase, in Low, L. (1998:47).
9 Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness (1998) Ministry of Trade and Industry,
p.3.
10 This is part of the Prime Minister’s letter of response on receiving a copy of
‘Committee  on Singapore’s Competitiveness’, 1998, Ministry of Trade and Industry, re-
printed at the beginning of the Report.
11 Committee On Singapore’s Competitiveness, Ministry of  Trade and Industry,
Singapore, Nov. 1998, p.6.
12 See Singapore Economic Development Board Annual Report 1997-8.
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13 Singapore Economic Development Board Annual Report 1997/8
(www/sedb.com.sg/who/mfg.html).
14 Singapore Economic Development Board Annual Report 1997/8
(www/sedb.com.sg/who/intlbuz.html).
15 Singapore Economic Development Board Annual Report 1997/8
(www/sedb.com.sg/who/i21g.html).
16 Lee Kuan Yew, Speech reported in the Straits Times, 9 December 1959, quoted in
Gopinathan, S. ‘Education and development in Singapore, in Tan, et al. 1997, p.41.
17 Lee Kuan Yew (1966) New bearings in our education system. Prime Minister’s
speech to the Principals of Schools, 29 August, quoted in John Yip Soon Kwong, Eng
Soo Peck and Jay Yap Ye Chin, ’25 years of educational reform’, in Tan, et al. 1997,
p.4.
18 Goh, Keng Swee et al. (1979) Report on the Ministry of Education, 1978, Singapore:
Ministry of Education, quoted in John Yip Soon Kwong, Eng Soo Peck and Jay Yap Ye
Chin, ’25 years of educational reform’, in Tan, et al., 1997, p.17.
19 See Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 1997, Singapore Department of Statistics,
Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1998, Tables 18.11 & 18.12.
20 Productivity and Standards Board figures.
21 Productivity and Standards Board, (1998) PSB Annual Report 1997-1998, p.45. The
tax was reduced in 1986 from 4% to 2% and then to 1% for all workers earning below
$1000 a month. This accounted for around 20% of the workforce in the late 1990s. Most
of the training programmes offered by PSB at subsidised to the tune of approximately
80% of costs (PSB interviews). [www.psb.gov.sg]
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